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WAR DEPARTMENT
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON

332-2000

(3552)

Leyte Operation, G-2 Intelligence Phases, 32nd Inf Division

14 Nov - 25 Dec '44



SECRET

OPERATIONS BRANCH A.G.O.
COMBAT ANALYSIS SECTION
ROOM 1 C 942, PENTAGON

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HEADQUARTERS SPECIAL TROOPS
32d Infantry Division
APO 32

CHM/ljf

15 January 1945

Subject: Report after Action.

To : Commanding General, 32d Infantry Division, APO 32.

1. Transmitted herewith two (2) copies, Report after Action, K-2
Operation of Hq Sp Trs & H q Co 32d Inf Div, covering the period 14 October
1944 to 25 D ecember 44 inclusive.

2. Request acknowledgement of receipt.

Charles H. Meyer

CHARLES H. MEYER
Lt Col, Infantry,
Commanding.

1 Incl:
Report after Action (dup)

332-2-6-2 A/A Rpt - 6-29 mtd C Phases - hwy to Opnu - 32nd Inf Div - 14 Nov - 25 Dec 44 hwy

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REPORT AFTER ACTION

LEYTE OPERATION - KING 2

G-2, Intelligence Phases

1. ENEMY ACTIVITIES:

The enemy forces encountered in the zone of action of the 32d Infantry Division were composed of the units of the 1st Inf Div which landed at ORMOC at approximately 1 November 1944. The units of this Div included the 1st Inf Regt, 49th Inf Regt, the 57th Inf Regt, the 1st FA Regt, the 1st Transportation Regt, the 1st Engr Regt, the 1st Rcn Regt and the 1st Signal Unit, with a total estimated strength of approximately 12,000 men.

As of 16 November 1944, the 57th Inf Regt was opposing our forces along BREAKNECK and CORKSCREW ridges approximately 2000 yds N of LIMON, and the 49th Inf Regt was located in the HILL 1525 area. Captured documents and PW statements indicate that the 1st Inf Regt, at that time, was in the MT PINA area and that it was later moved NW to the LIMON area to reinforce the 57th Inf, which was encountering heavy opposition from our forces. The 1st Inf Regt went into action in the LIMON sector on approximately 19 November. The exact location of the 1st Transportation Regt, the 1st Rcn Regt and the 1st Engr Regt on 16 November was not known. Elements of the Engr Regt were attached to the three infantry regiments. The CP of the 1st Japanese Division was located just W of Km marker 79 on Hwy 2 at this time (UG.1-61.0).

On 19 November the 2d Bn, 49th Inf made an attack to the N from the vicinity of HILL 1525 and succeeded in establishing positions astride the highway between CULASIAN and PINAMOPOAN. This was apparently the only portion of the 1st Div's "all-out attack", scheduled to have taken place on approximately 15 November, which was carried out according to plan. The preparations for this attack were apparently disrupted by our artillery fire and our vigorous patrol activities between CAPOOCAN and PINAMOPOAN. The presence of members of the 49th Labor Unit and other small parties equipped with a large amount of demolition equipment, and operational orders captured, indicate that the primary missions of this attack were to destroy our artillery positions and dump areas. The 2d Bn, 49th Inf, which made the attack, was practically annihilated by 23 November and PW information later disclosed that, on 25 November, the remnants of the 1st and 2d Bns of the 49th Inf were consolidated with a total strength of approximately 500 men. The 1st Bn, 49th Inf apparently suffered heavy losses while attempting to drive to-

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
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ward CAPOOCAN against our troops. This consolidated battalion was then apparently driven to the SE to the vicinity of HILL 1836 by elements of the 126th Inf advancing through the HILL 1525 area, again driven to the SW by the 112th Cavalry, and remnants finally joined the battered remains of all three regiments just E of Hwy 2.


The 57th Inf Regt, in excellent positions on commanding ground to the NE of LIMON, offered determined resistance against our steamroller drive to the S. His positions on either side of Hwy 2 were speedily eliminated, but his forces on the SE end of BREAKNECK and CORKSCREW ridges, approximately 1 mile NE of LIMON, were extremely difficult to dislodge. These positions, held by the 57th Inf Regt, were located on the crests and slopes of densely wooded razor-back ridges, with excellent fields of fire, making approaches and location by our troops very difficult. The determined stand of the 57th Inf Regt in this area was made possible by the supply corridor which they maintained with the help of the 3d Bn, 49th Inf and elements of the 1st Bn, 1st Inf. This supply corridor extended from their positions on BREAKNECK RIDGE, S to the small island in the LEYTE RIVER just E of Hwy 2, continuing S to their ammunition and supply dumps in caves on both sides of Hwy 2. The 3d Bn, 49th Inf, which had been in the HILL 1525 area until approximately 23 November, was forced to withdraw to the NW by our advance through the HILL 1525 area and were utilized to maintain the supply corridor to the fighting 57th. The maintenance of these positions so far to the N, while our troops continued to push S in a double envelopment, illustrates the fanatic and inflexible determination of the Jap to carry out his orders to attack PINAMOPOAN, without considering the changes in the situation and without taking advantage of other courses of action open to him. By 2 December our forces were successful in blocking all of his supply routes and, cut off from further supplies of ammunition and rations, the determined strong point of the enemy spearhead was either annihilated or forced to withdraw by approximately 12 December. Captured documents indicated that, on 5 December, the total strength of the Jap 57th Inf and the 3d Bn, 49th Inf was only 772 men and that their orders were to attack and fight to the last man. The tenacity of these troops in adhering to their intentions in spite of the futility of the situation is forceably illustrated by a PW who stated that the Regimental CPs of all 3 regiments remained in this area to the NE of LIMON, preparing for the drive to the N coast, even though their situation was hopeless, until approximately 12 December when they were forced to flee to the S.

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The 1st Inf Regt was sent to the aid of the beleaguered 57th Inf and on 20 November was disposed with its 2d Bn on the W of Hwy 2 and its 1st Bn on the E of the highway with the 3d Bn to the S of the 1st Bn. This regiment was to stop our advance to the S and was to aid the 57th Inf in their "all-out" attack. The 1st Bn, 1st Inf was also used to help maintain the supply corridor and for supplying the 57th Inf.

The 2d Bn of the 1st Inf made numerous unsuccessful, piece-meal attacks on our battalion in the KILAY RIDGE area. In these futile attacks, this Jap Bn suffered heavy losses, and captured documents indicated that the battalion strength was reduced to approximately 240 men by the end of November.

The 3d Bn, 1st Inf was apparently the last battalion committed to action in the enemy's attempts to stem the tide of our determined march to the S. This battalion operated to the E of Hwy 2 and S of the LEYTE RIVER. The heavy losses inflicted on this unit by our troops is illustrated by the information taken from a captured document stating that, on 29 November, after approximately six days in action, the 11th Company had only one officer and 15 men remaining in the company.


The 1st Ron Regt and the remainder of the 1st Engr Regt was utilized by the Japs on the W of Hwy 2 to provide security and protection for the gun positions of the 1st FA Regt, most of which were in the vicinity of KALOGBACAN, and to oppose our advance to the S. These troops offered fanatical resistance to elements of the 127th and 128th Inf Regts but by 14 December these Jap regiments were practically annihilated and most of the Jap artillery pieces were overrun by our infantry or destroyed by our artillery fire.

By 13 December all of the Jap forces to the E of Hwy 2 had been forced to withdraw to approximately 3000 yds S of the LEYTE RIVER bridge, where the once mighty 1st Jap Division made its last stand. The remnants of the Engr Regt, the 3 Inf Regts, and the 1st Signal Units were all located in the same general area to the E of Hwy 2 and W and S of BONBONGON. The Division CP, the 3 Regtl CPs and the 1st Field Hospital were all together, on three ridges, with elaborate and extensive defenses, resulting in a veritable honeycomb of deep and well constructed foxholes and pillboxes, with numerous connecting trenches. The last organized resistance of the crack 1st Inf Div, under continued pressure from our infantry and our intense and accurate artillery fire, was finally shattered on 21 December and the few remaining survivors fled to the S and W.

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The effectiveness and efficiency of our infantry and artillery can best be illustrated by the rapid depletion of the 1st Jap Division. Of the 12,000 troops which landed on 1 and 2 November, only approximately 2000 remained on 13 December, and on 21 December, after six weeks of fighting, only 500 Japs remained.

In our drive B, on Hwy 2, large quantities of enemy equipment and large amounts of ammunition of all calibers were captured between the LEYTE RIVER bridge and LONCOY, strewn on both sides of the road and carefully concealed in small caves dug into embankments on either side of the highway. A PW stated that the 1st Field Hospital, in the vicinity of the 1st Division CP, had contained as many as 500 patients as late as 17 December.


2. OPERATIONS OF COMPONENT ELEMENTS:

a. Infantry: All of the fighting during this campaign was conducted on extremely difficult and mountainous terrain and consisted of some of the bitterest and bloodiest battles ever fought in the Southwest Pacific. All of the troops at the enemy's disposal were eventually utilized as infantrymen, regardless of their previously assigned duties, and the typical fanatic Jap spirit of fighting to the death in hopeless situations was very much in evidence. These forces demonstrated excellent fire discipline and withheld their fire until they could obtain the greatest possible effect from their fire power. Jap troops in well dug-in and well camouflaged positions would permit advance echelons of our forces to by-pass their positions and would then deliver effective fire on the main body of troops which were advancing with less caution and in larger, closer groups. As a general rule, enemy resistance was light during the morning hours and increased in intensity late in the afternoon until the hours of darkness. Night attacks were not encountered as frequently as in previous campaigns. During our artillery barrages enemy troops would vacate their positions and reoccupy them before our infantry could overrun the positions. When enemy positions were surrounded or enveloped they did not withdraw, but resisted so stubbornly that it was necessary to overrun the position and eliminate each Jap by hand-to-hand combat. Although all of the operational orders which were captured spoke only of the offensive and of attacks, the Jap troops demonstrated training and experience in organizing positions for defense. Many of the Jap positions were located on reverse slopes of hills and most effective use was made of every defensive terrain feature available.

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Attacks made by Jap forces were piece-meal, lacked coordination, and were not supported by their artillery or aircraft. The Japs used numerous snipers who were usually equipped with weapons having telescopic sights and demonstrated good marksmanship. Snipers would allow vehicles to pass unmolested and fire upon foot troops marching along the road. Aid men were frequently targets of these Jap snipers. Small parties of Japs often infiltrated during the night, cut telephone lines and lay in ambush awaiting the arrival of signal personnel. Captured documents indicated that Jap units had been trained in suicide attacks against our tanks but they had no opportunity to demonstrate their training. The absence of night attacks may be explained by the fact that infantrymen were sent back to supply dumps during the night, to replenish the supply of ammunition and rations for the next day's engagement.

b. Artillery: Although enemy artillery was active in counter-battery fire and harassing fire on dumps and CPs, very little use was made of close artillery support for either offensive or defensive efforts of his infantry troops. The Jap artillery fire received was not highly effective due to a large amount of dispersion and lack of intensity of fire. Due to the extensively mountainous terrain and the mud encountered throughout the campaign, Jap artillery positions were usually close to the road. Their guns were located in well-concealed, covered, emplacements with caves for the protection of the crews (see illustrated example #10). Enemy artillery continued their old trick of placing artillery fire into our positions when our artillery was firing to make our troops think our own artillery was firing short. Artillery rounds were also used as land mines by burying the projectile in the road with its fuse pointing upward. Jap ammunition supplies were plentiful and large amounts of ammunition of all calibers were captured in the dump areas. (see illustrated examples 7, 8 and 10).

c. Tanks: Two Jap tank companies were known to have been operating in this area during the campaign but did not present a problem as far as extensive mechanized attacks were concerned. Captured documents and tank operational orders indicated that a tank attack on PINAMOPOAN was planned on 9 December, but the only result was a small abortive attack by three light tanks against the 126th Inf's positions on the E side of Hwy 2, approximately 2000 yds S of the LEYTE RIVER bridge. Captured documents indicated that the enemy tanks were easily damaged, even by small arms fire and the damage caused by our infantry and artillery, plus the shortage of parts available, made it ex-

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tremely difficult for the enemy to maintain very many of its tanks in action. Disabled tanks, before being abandoned were sometimes used as stationary pillboxes, as long as their guns would function, and were then placed across the highway to form road blocks against our advance. The most extensive use of tanks made by the Japs was for moving artillery pieces and hauling supplies of ammunition and rations to forward dump areas under fire.

d. Air: Enemy air activity in this sector was of minor consequence and consisted mainly of small nuisance raids which caused little or no damage. Most of the bombs dropped landed in CARIGARA BAY or unoccupied areas and, in two instances, ineffective strafing passes were made on barges in the bay.

e. Supplies: During the entire campaign, the supply of ammunition to Jap troops was more than adequate, in spite of the difficulties of transportation and movement. Large amounts of ammunition, especially for small arms, were found in caves in the Jap supply area on both sides of Hwy 2 (see illustrated Examples 4, 7, 8 and 9). Until late in the campaign, supplies of rations to front line troops was maintained at a higher level than that of other Jap forces previously engaged by this Division. However, ration supplies were still below the prescribed amounts, and it was a common practice for Jap troops to forage for native foods. Because of the limited road net, muddy roads, and difficult terrain, most of the supplies were transported by carriers who moved only at night. Since Filipinos did not cooperate with the Japs, it was necessary for them to use infantry troops as carriers. The procedure was for a few men from each group to go back to the supply dump at night and bring back ammunition and rations for the following day.

f. Communications: In spite of the fact that the Jap forces in this area seemed to be well supplied with most modern implements of war, there was a surprisingly small amount of communications equipment in evidence. Although some of this equipment may have been buried by the retreating enemy the indications are that signal equipment was scarce and communication facilities very limited. This is confirmed by the fact that only two telephone circuits were found connecting the Div CP with higher headquarters, and very few other telephone wires were discovered. Telephone communication, apparently was not used by units smaller than a regiment, and when it was used, ground-return circuits were utilized, which would indicate a shortage of wire. Radios were used only for units of regimental size or higher. This apparent lack of communication facilities would partially account for his lack of coordination between infantry and artillery units. The delay occasioned

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by the extensive use of runners was, no doubt, a contributing factor towards his confusion, mis-information, and eventual defeat.

3. MISCELLANEOUS:

a. Estimated Enemy Casualties as of 25 December: 6400 Japs killed and 37 Psw captured.

b. Enemy equipment Captured or Destroyed During the 6 weeks of the Campaign:

	<u>T/A</u>	<u>Captured or Des</u>
2½ Ton Trucks	-	13
Staff Cars	-	3
Armored Cars	-	2
Light Tanks	26-31	20
Tankettes	-	5
Grenade Dischargers	282	95
IMGs	342	123
BMGs	54	82
50mm Mortars	-	3
90mm Mortars	63	5
37mm A/T Guns	} 18	1
47mm A/T Guns		7
70mm Bn Guns	18	7
75mm Howitzers	24	20
100mm Howitzers	18	13
150mm Howitzers	9	5
Flame Throwers	6	5
Air Compressors	-	3
Radios	-	18

c. Weather and Terrain: During the entire six weeks of the campaign, almost continuous, heavy rains made roads and trails "seas of mud". Often it was difficult to move even tracked vehicles. Equipment and clothing were never dry and movement of troops over steep mountain trails was almost impossible. Hwy 2, the only road available for the movement of supplies, became so mired that it was impossible to maintain it for any military traffic. The total rainfall during the period 16 November to 25 December was 21.4" (see illustrated Example #6).

The terrain along the coast of CARIGARA BAY is very marshy and swampy, making selection of dump areas and movements of vehicles difficult. Even tracked vehicles were unable to

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operate when off the highway, and some portions of Hwy 2 could not be negotiated by vehicular traffic. The terrain over which most of the fighting took place, between the coast and LONCOY, and E and W of Hwy 2, consisted of numerous precipitous, razor-back ridges, partially covered with thick rain forests and with numerous fallen and rotten timbers, which made camouflaged positions most difficult to detect. In addition, those areas not covered by exceedingly high cogon grass, were covered with thick undergrowth which had to be hacked through during the advance, adding a further hindrance to mopping-up operations. The Japs made maximum use of the peculiarities of the terrain in organizing their defensive positions, by placing their foxholes behind logs, under roots of trees, and hollowing small caves in the cuts on either side of Hwy 2 (see illustrated Examples 4, 5, 8 and 9). The reverse slopes of each hill were utilized for excellent positions which were well-dug-in and camouflaged. These positions enabled the enemy to remain defiladed from our artillery fire and still place effective grazing fire on the crest of the hill. Enemy positions that were located on forward slopes were usually on a nose or near a draw, enabling the Japs to seek shelter in the draw or around on the reverse slope of the nose during our artillery and mortar barrages, and to regain their positions rapidly when the barrage was lifted. The Jap foxholes were constructed in the shape of a boot, with some as deep as 10 feet (see Example #2 in illustrations attached to this report). Some of these foxholes were even covered to evade detection (see examples #1, 3, 4 and 5).

d. Information obtained from Captured Documents and PSW:

Most of the prisoners captured had been away from their units for a period of ten days or more and generally were unable to furnish information of immediate tactical value. In addition, transportation difficulties seriously delayed the receipt of prisoners for interrogation at both Regimental and Division Headquarters. Prisoners were very willing to furnish information and, at times, were helpful in locating ration dumps and artillery positions, but seldom could reveal the location or plans of their unit. One PW was the adjutant of the 1st FA Regt. He was able to furnish the dispositions of the various battalions and the number of guns which were actually landed and brought into operation. When capture was imminent, numerous potential PSW committed suicide with hand grenades (see illustrated Example #11). Captured documents were usually too old to be of immediate tactical value. It was interesting to note, however, that although all of their orders consistently referred to "all-out attacks" and annihilation of the enemy,

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the Japs remained predominately on the defensive throughout the operation. Messages and fragmentary orders captured were usually too vague and incomplete to provide a picture of the enemy's intentions. The few diaries captured, invariably emphasized the extreme accuracy and effectiveness of our artillery fire. The absence of dogtags and other means of identification on large numbers of bodies searched indicated that these troops had received recent and thorough instruction in security measures.

4. CONCLUSIONS (summary of Lessons Learned):

a. notwithstanding our numerical superiority of men, weapons and equipment, it is believed that the enemy's defeat was, to a great extent, due to his own combat inefficiency. His lack of coordinated effort, his piece-meal attacks with one unit apparently ignorant of the operations of another, his failure to utilize his artillery in close support of his infantry, his confused and vague messages and inadequate and incorrect maps, all contributed to his inevitable elimination.

b. examples of the Enemy's Shortcomings are as Follows:

(1) Early in the campaign, with excellent OPs, the Japs used their artillery entirely for counter-battery fire and harassing fire on our rear areas. With the excellent observation he possessed and the apparently adequate amount of ammunition at his disposal he could have more lucratively employed his artillery against our mired truck columns and our front line troops. Direct artillery support for his front line troops was conspicuously absent, both in his attacks and in his defense. A captured artillery diary indicated that the Japs experienced difficulty in maintaining communication between their OPs and gun positions. In one case they withheld their fire until communications were reestablished, and then, when this was accomplished, the gun was damaged so that fire missions were never completed.

(2) The maps in possession of the Jap forces were more inadequate and incorrect than those used by our own troops. The confusion which resulted can best be illustrated by the captured messages in which one Jap commander told another that he was located on HILL 1525 and the answering message stated the first Jap commander's headquarters could not be on HILL 1525 because his headquarters was on that hill and had been there for some time. Unobserved artillery fires which calculated data from firing charts were necessarily inaccurate because of the poor map situation.

5. INTELLIGENCE:

a. Sources of Information: Infantry patrols, 32d Recon Troop, artillery liaison planes, guerrillas and natives, PsW, captured documents, aerial photos, and messages from higher and adjacent units.

(1) Infantry patrols were utilized extensively but the completeness and accuracy of the information obtained was reduced by the difficult terrain and dense undergrowth. Complete reconnaissance of an area was often impossible. Inadequate and incorrect maps also contributed to this shortcoming.

(2) The 32d Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop conducted extensive reconnaissance of enemy rear area activities and installations for a period of 42 days and provided timely and accurate information which was of inestimable value and contributed greatly to the expeditious defeat of the enemy forces in the northern ORMOC VALLEY. Operating from a base deep in enemy territory near AGAYAYAN, the Troop established and maintained numerous observation posts and conducted numerous patrol missions to locate dump areas, bivouacs, and artillery positions and then aided in destroying these installations by adjusting long range artillery fire on them. During this period the Troop captured a captain of Field Artillery and successfully evacuated all of these prisoners to our own lines for interrogation. They captured a total of 9 PsW.

(3) Air liaison planes proved valuable, not only in adjusting artillery fire, but also on reconnaissance missions to check patrol information, native reports and the location of enemy installations which had been detected by photo interpretation. In addition, these planes aided in the operations by supplementing the means of communication of isolated units both by radio and dropped messages.

(4) Information obtained from guerrillas and natives was often found to be false and was usually found to be exaggerated, especially as to strength of enemy forces. Although these reports could not be relied upon, each report that sounded at all plausible was checked by a patrol or some other reconnaissance agency.

(5) PsW and captured documents were very useful in reconstructing the history of the enemy's tactical movements and reactions to our operations, but very little information of immediate tactical importance regarding projected operations of the enemy was received.

A large number of the prisoners obtained were new replacements who were not too well informed on military matters.

(6) Aerial photographs were a valuable aid in studying the terrain and in accurately locating the relative positions of our troops which was difficult with the poor maps which had to be employed. Several operational sketches were made from a stereoscopic study of available photographs and were of inestimable value to troop commanders in plotting dispositions and movements of their own troops. Interpretations of aerial photos disclosed the location of enemy installations and centers of activity.

b. Maps and Aerial Photography: Maps of the zone of action, furnished at the beginning of the operation, were little better than grid sheets upon which a road had been plotted and on the first maps received, even the road had been plotted incorrectly. Later revisions of these maps were quite an improvement, but still lacked detailed accuracy, especially as to hill formations. These revised maps were not received until the operation had already passed the critical stages. Numerous maps and sketches were made by this headquarters and by subordinate units which would have proven valuable had the facilities for adequate reproduction been available. Operational sketches were made from aerial photos and hectographed copies were distributed to subordinate units, but the continuous rains destroyed these sketches after only one day of use in the field, because of the fact that the only paper available lacked quality and durability. Photography requested was often received too late to be of operational value. A request for photo runs of the area between Hwy 2 and the W coast in the Division's zone of action was complied with by a "crazy-quilt" pattern of uncoordinated strips which failed to cover some sections of the area and covered other sections as many as eight times. Aerial photos produced in this manner make it necessary for foot troops in the field to carry an unnecessarily large number of photos in order to have complete coverage.

c. Operations of the G-2 Section:

(1) The G-2 Section and attached specialists of this Division are organized as follows:

	<u>Os</u>	<u>RM</u>
G-2 Section Proper	4	10
Language Section	2	4
Aerial Photo Interpretation	2	4
Enemy Order of Battle	1	2

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	<u>Os</u>	<u>EM</u>
Public Relations	1	1
Counter-Intelligence Corps	2	5
Censorship	1	-
Totals	<u>13</u>	<u>26</u>

(2) Operating Procedure:

- (a) In the G-2 Section proper the G-2 is kept free from administrative details as much as possible. Two officers are utilized alternately as duty officer for 16 hours a day. These officers check and process all incoming messages and prepare reports to higher headquarters. The enlisted personnel consists of a Chief of Section, 3 stenographers, 2 draftsmen, 2 journal clerks, 1 map supply clerk and one messenger
- (b) The Language Section of two officers and four interrogators in the Division CP accomplish the interrogation of PsW and the translation of all captured documents.
- (c) The CIC detachment at Division Headquarters consists of two officers and 5 enlisted men who process captured enemy equipment, apprehend enemy collaborators, conduct investigations and interrogations of both military and civilian personnel, and enforce counterintelligence measures. In addition, there are also 3 CIC men attached to each regiment who collect and dispatch enemy documents and equipment to Division Headquarters
- (d) The Aerial Photo Interpretation Section of 2 officers and four enlisted men is utilized for the compiling, distribution and filing of all aerial photographs received and the preparation of studies of these photos.
- (e) The Order of Battle Team of one officer and 2 enlisted men maintain files on personalities and the composition of all enemy forces operating in the area.

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- (f) The Public Relations Section of one officer and one enlisted man are used to meet, guide, and advise all war correspondents who visit the Division, arrange for photographers to cover newsworthy events and supervise the writing of newsstories in subordinate units.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Distribution of Personnel: The G-2 section, with all of its specialized personnel necessary to accomplish its numerous functions, is much too large for a mobile forward Division CP. It is possible for the section to operate efficiently with the Photo Interpretation Team, The Public Relations Section, the CIC personnel and the Censorship Officer in a rear echelon. This echelon should be close enough to the CP so that adequate communication, both wire and vehicle, can be maintained.

b. Reports to Higher Headquarters: It is recommended that situation reports to higher headquarters be submitted every three or four hours. More frequent reports place an undue strain on the limited facilities and personnel available in a Division CP.


GEORGE A. BOND, JR.,
Lt. Col., G. S. C.,
AC of S, G-2.

7 Appendices:

- (a) G-2 Journal, 15 Nov 44 - 26 Nov 44
- (b) G-2 Journal, 26 Nov 44 - 7 Dec 44
- (c) G-2 Journal, 7 Dec 44 - 16 Dec 44
- (d) G-2 Journal, 16 Dec 44 - 25 Dec 44
- (e) Order of Battle report to supplement G-2 Journals
- (f) Map Catalogs
- (g) Aerial Photographs of Leyte Campaign

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R E P O R T A F T E R A C T I O N

LEYTE OPERATION - KING 2

G-2, INTELLIGENCE PHASES

Inclosure No 4,
To Unit Report
K-2 Operation

HQ 32nd INFANTRY DIVISION

14 Nov 44 - 25 Dec 44

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